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Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons 
Lee Anne Fennell∗ 
 
 In recent years, theorists interested in the commons have increasingly broadened 
their gaze to take in two new entries in the property lexicon: the anticommons1 and the 
semicommons.2 Notwithstanding some excellent work comparing and contrasting these 
templates and their associated tragedies,3 the literature lacks a cohesive account of how 
they relate to each other and to larger questions of incentive misalignment. Although 
scholars sometimes frame the commons, anticommons, and semicommons as distinct 
property types (see, e.g., Heller 2008, 37 fig. 2.9), each is best understood as a lens for 
apprehending a single core, challenging fact about resource systems—their need to 
accommodate multiple uses that are most efficiently pursued at different scales, whether 
simultaneously or over time.4 This chapter offers a brief introduction to the commons, 
anticommons, and semicommons models and shows how the three fit together in a 
unified theoretical framework.  
 
I.  The Commons  
 
 Although the underlying idea is much older,5 Garrett Hardin (1968) popularized 
the phrase “tragedy of the commons” and illustrated it with an example involving an 
open-access pasture (ibid., 1244). Reasoning that each rancher would bear only a fraction 
of the costs of grazing another steer but would internalize all of the benefits of doing so, 
Hardin predicted that the pasture would be overgrazed (ibid). The same problem of 
incentive misalignment can lead people to underinvest in collective activities (communal 
farms or public television, for example), take too many resource units out of a given 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Portions of this chapter are adapted from Fennell 
2004. I am grateful to Kenneth Ayotte, Jim Krier, Henry Smith, and Lior Strahilevitz for comments on 
earlier drafts. Catherine Kiwala and Eric Singer provided excellent research assistance. 
1 The anticommons was first conceptualized by Frank Michelman (1982, 6, 9; 1985, 6-7) and later adapted 
and applied by Michael Heller (1998; 2008).  
2 The term “semicommons,” as used in this chapter, was coined by Henry Smith (2000) to refer to 
interacting private and common property uses. A different usage appears in Levmore 2002, S422 (referring 
to a system of “open access and restricted use”).  
3 A recent paper modeling the relationship among these three templates is Bertacchini, Mot & Depoorter 
2008; see also Heller, this volume. Previous scholarship addressing the relationship between the commons 
and the anticommons includes, for example, Michelman 1985; Buchanan & Yoon 2000; Hsu 2003; Fennell 
2004; and Munzer 2005. 
4 The issue of multiple scales has been closely associated with the semicommons. See, e.g., Smith 2000; 
Bertacchini, Mot, & Depoorter 2008, 11. Other discussions of scale as it relates to the ownership and use of 
property include, for example, Ellickson 1993; Lueck 1989, 300-03; and Sinden 2007, 556-61, 585-93.  
5 Antecedents to Hardin’s analysis, including the work of Aristotle, are noted in Ostrom 1990, 2-3. 
Important economic treatments of common pool resources include Warming 1911; Gordon 1954; Demsetz 
1967; and Cheung 1970.  
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system (as by overfishing), or put too many “bads” into a system (such as smog, litter, or 
email spam).6  
 Hardin’s pasture fable conjures up a distinctively compelling brand of 
inefficiency: a self-contained system that is transparently suboptimal for its own 
participants. Because the exploiters and the exploitees are one and the same—Hardin’s 
ranchers harmed only themselves—the label of “tragedy” seems especially apt and 
uncontroversial. It is not a matter of one group benefiting at the expense of another, much 
less a question of whose interests should take priority. Rather, we see a group shooting 
itself in its collective foot through self-defeating behavior. Parties interacting in real-
world resource systems rarely deliver and realize losses in such a cleanly symmetrical 
manner, but the stylized commons tragedy neatly excises thorny questions of distribution 
from the picture to focus attention on the unambiguous costs of self-interested actions.  
 
 A. The Commons without the Tragedy 
 
 Despite its merits as a rhetorical device, the tragedy of the commons story often 
fails to square with reality. The fact that a resource is held in common need not spell 
disaster, as the successful management of many common-pool resources throughout 
history—including common grazing lands—attests (see, e.g., Dahlman 1980, 130-38; 
Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2009). Refutations of Hardin’s gloomy syllogism frequently begin 
by drawing a distinction between an open-access resource that anyone can exploit and a 
limited-access commons that is closed to all but its members (e.g., Ciriacy-Wantrup & 
Bishop 1975, 714-15; Eggertsson 2003, 75-76; Dagan & Heller 2001, 556-57)—what 
Carol Rose has aptly termed “property on the outside” (Rose 1998b, 155). The ability to 
exclude outsiders is important because it makes feasible a wider range of local, informal 
institutional solutions (see, e.g., Ostrom 1990, 91-92; 2009). Interestingly, the very 
features that lend power and elegance to the tragedy as a thought experiment—the closed 
system in which a small number of homogeneous individuals interact in reciprocal and 
symmetrical ways over time—may also allow real-world individuals to cooperate with 
each other in ways that avert tragedy (see, e.g., Ellickson 1991, 184-206). Yet although 
limited-access commons can often design around potentially tragic incentive structures, 
the mere fact that a commons is not open to the entire world does not immunize it from 
tragedy (Ostrom 1990, 91-92). 
 There are more fundamental reasons that tragedy may not follow from common 
ownership. First, misaligned incentives (that is, the existence of positive or negative 
                                                 
6 The literature on resource dilemmas is vast. For some examples, see Ostrom, Gardner & Walker 1994, 14-
15 (discussing underprovision and underuse problems); Libecap & Smith 2002 (overextraction of oil); 
Thompson 2000, 250 (“overdrafting” of water); Ellickson 1993, 1326 (shirking in communal farming); 
Eggertsson 2003, 77 (discussing “supply side” effects of open access regimes, such as the disincentive to 
invest). The distinction between “resource units,” such as fish, and “resource systems,” such as fisheries, is 
emphasized in Hess & Ostrom 2003, 121; see also Lueck 2003, 202 (distinguishing between resource 
“stocks” and “flows”).  
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externalities) can only generate inefficient results if they lead actors to choose differently 
than they would have under conditions of full internalization. This criterion will not 
always be met (see Buchanan & Stubblebine 1962, 374–76; Dukeminier et al. 2006, 44-
45; Haddock 2007). For example, people fishing from a remote pond may ignore the 
effects of their actions on others without triggering a tragic collapse of the fish 
population, if their decisions of whether and how much to fish would remain unchanged 
after taking into account the full social impact.7 Similarly, people may add value by 
participating in a network such as a marketplace, festival, or road system without taking 
into account the positive spillovers their participation produces for others.8  
 Second, tragedy can only exist if it is technologically possible for the resource 
system to deliver different amounts of surplus as a result of individual choices.9 Here it 
becomes important to clarify the sense in which struggles over finite resources can 
constitute commons tragedies. Consider a group of partygoers aggressively harvesting 
hors d’oeuvres from a buffet table’s dwindling supply. Assuming no food is actually lost 
in the fray (and setting aside the important question of where the provisions came from in 
the first place), the outcome might seem to be a matter of pure distribution. Of course, the 
partygoers may derive varying amounts of marginal utility from the snacks, but we 
cannot be sure that the allocation produced by pushiness is inefficient—perhaps 
successfully aggressive food-harvesters are also higher valuers of food, on average.  
 To attribute tragedy to the spectacle, we must recognize not only the commons 
comprising the food itself, but also a second commons that is linked to the first, which we 
might call “the party atmosphere” or, more broadly, “the resource-gathering 
environment.” Actions that merely change the distribution of food harvested from the 
first commons may significantly degrade this second commons, whether in ways overt 
(tong injuries) or subtle (dampened conversation). Because each person may undertake 
individually rational but collectively costly efforts to get more of an underlying resource, 
a commons tragedy may cause even a fixed resource to yield up less total surplus to the 
group.10  
  
                                                 
7 See, e.g., De Alessi 2003, 91 (observing that “[o]pen access does not present a problem as long as the 
supply of a resource is so great relative to the demand that there is no (net) gain from conserving or 
improving it”); Rose 1986, 717-18 (discussing “plenteous” goods); Epstein 1994, 28 (observing that when 
water is abundant, diversion may “produce private gains that exceed the losses to the commons”). 
8 Carol Rose (1986, 767-70) refers to the potential for such interaction and associated spillovers as “the 
comedy of the commons.” She notes, however, that a risk of underinvestment exists that might countered 
by legal doctrines that help to encourage rather than discourage such participation. See ibid. at 767-79. 
9 See, e.g., Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994, 15-16 (characterizing “suboptimal outcomes” and the 
capacity to improve matters through “institutionally feasible alternatives” as preconditions of a common-
pool resource dilemma); Michelman 1985, 5-6 (observing that “degradability” is required for a “supposedly 
tragic common”).  
10 Tragedies of the resource-gathering commons are not limited to “fixed pot” resources, although they may 
receive special attention in that context. See Posner 2003, 35-36 (discussing wasteful competition to 
recover treasure from a shipwreck); see also Anderson & McChesney 2003, 5 (discussing wasteful 
competition for open-access resources).  
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 B. The Prisoner’s Dilemma  
 
 The commons tragedy and its connection to problems of scale can be better 
understood by boiling it down to its two-player structural equivalent, the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.11 Like the tragedy of the commons, the Prisoner’s Dilemma derives its analytic 
power from the transparent manner in which the parties make self-defeating choices. 
Consider a miniature version of Hardin’s pasture that is shared by two ranchers, Rowena 
and Columbo.12 
 
Table 1:  A Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Payoffs for (Rowena, Columbo) 
 
Columbo Refrains 
from Adding Cattle Columbo Adds Cattle 
Rowena Refrains 
from Adding Cattle (0, 0) (–7, 3) 
Rowena Adds Cattle (3, –7) (–4, –4) 
 
When we meet our protagonists, each has already added cattle to the pasture up to the 
socially optimal point. Each must now decide whether to add yet another animal. Doing 
so will generate ten in benefits and fourteen in costs; hence, it is a losing proposition 
from a societal standpoint. But consider things from, say, Rowena’s point of view. 
Because she will internalize the full benefit (ten) from adding a steer, but will bear only 
half the cost (seven) inflicted on the pasture, she will enjoy a positive payoff of three by 
adding a steer. Her realization that Colombo will reason the same way does not change 
her decision. While Colombo’s decision to add an animal drops Rowena’s payoff to 
negative four in a world where she adds a steer as well, she would do even worse 
(negative seven) if she refrained from adding cattle in that state of the world. The 
dominant strategy for each player is to defect; hence, the lower righthand corner of Table 
1 represents the Nash equilibrium (see Baird, Gertner, & Picker 1994, 21-22; 33-34). 
 
 
                                                 
11 The Prisoner’s Dilemma captures the choice faced by each of two prisoners who are questioned 
separately about their joint crime and must decide whether to stay silent (cooperate) or testify (defect). 
Under the payoff structure presented, each player does better by defecting, regardless of what the other 
prisoner does, even though the pair would do better jointly if both cooperated. See, e.g., Baird, Gertner, & 
Picker 1994, 33-34; Goetz 1984, 8-17. The structural equivalence between the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the 
tragedy of the commons has been frequently noted. See, e.g., Ostrom 1990, 3; Baird, Gertner, & Picker 
1994, 34; Michelman 1985, 9). 
12 For similar applications of the Prisoner’s Dilemma to the overgrazing problem, see Baird, Gertner, & 
Picker 1994, 34; Ostrom 1990, 3-5. 
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 C. The Problem of Scale 
 
 The payoff structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma satisfies the preconditions for 
tragedy laid out above: the players make different decisions than they would if they were 
taking into account all the implications of their actions, and the resulting combination of 
blindered choices produces less overall surplus for the pair. What accounts for this payoff 
structure? The usual focus of blame is each rancher’s ability to externalize some of the 
grazing costs attributable to adding an animal to the commons, which is in turn a function 
of common ownership of the land. But the problem is just as much a result of the 
rancher’s ability to fully internalize the grazing benefits associated with adding an 
animal. That ability to internalize benefits flows from a property system in which the 
rancher holds individual (or “private”)13 property rights in the steer, and continues to hold 
those rights regardless of how much communal grass it ingests.14 It is not, then, the 
commonly owned land alone that produces the rancher’s dilemma; it is instead the mix of 
individual and common ownership.15 The same is true of any other commons problem 
one might care to identify, from overfishing to shirking on a communal farm—although 
in some cases the private ownership in question is of one’s person or one’s labor rather 
than of a chattel or hunk of real estate. 
 Close analysis of the tragedy of the commons thus reveals an intriguing fact: The 
dilemma is driven by the presence of two (or more) activities that are being pursued at 
different scales and under different property arrangements.16 The problem for Hardin’s 
rancher is only partly about the fact that grazing is pursued at a large scale and on 
commonly owned ground; it can be equally attributed to the fact that the raising of cattle 
is pursued through individual ownership of the animals. Furthermore, the mix of 
ownership types occurs under circumstances that permit private ownership to be used as a 
platform for offloading costs onto the commons, and that allow access to the commons to 
be used for the benefit of private property (the roving cattle). In other words, as will be 
developed further below, the prototypical commons tragedy grows out of an arrangement 
that looks a good deal like a semicommons—a system in which private and common 
property uses interact (Smith 2000). 
 If two resource uses conducted at different scales and under different ownership 
regimes generate payoffs like those shown in Table 1, we might examine the prospects 
                                                 
13 In the commons literature, the term “private property” is used to designate individually owned 
resources—a convention I follow here. For an objection to the use of the term “private ownership” as a 
synonym for “individual ownership,” see Krier 2008, 5-6  n.17.  
14 See Lueck 2003, 202 (discussing appropriation of resource units from commonly owned stock).  
15 This point receives attention in a paper that was under development at the same time as this chapter 
(Krier 2008, 11 & n. 29). Earlier work emphasizing the significance of the juxtaposition of private and 
common ownership to resource dilemmas includes Lueck 2003, 202; and Gordon 1954, 135.  
16 The challenges associated with multiple concurrent scales have been explored at length in the 
semicommons context (Smith 2000), and have also been raised in the context of the anticommons. See 
Heller 1999, 1221 (“Property often functions well as private property on one scale of aggregation, but as an 
anticommons on another.”). 
6 
for rescaling one use or the other to reduce the degree of mismatch. In the case of the 
ranchers, we might conclude that grazing need not be undertaken on a large scale after all 
and respond with parcelization (see, e.g., Ellickson 1993, 1327-28). If individually owned 
cattle are grazed on individually owned plots of land, the costs of grazing fall on the same 
rancher who internalizes the benefits of it. But the redrawing of property lines need not 
move in the direction of more private ownership; we might instead place more elements 
under common ownership. For example, we might decide that individual ownership of 
cattle is unnecessary and place the cattle themselves, as well as the grazing land, under 
common ownership.  
 A close analog can be found in unitization, a prevalent approach for managing oil 
and gas reserves that underlie multiple properties (see Libecap & Smith 2002, S595-96). 
If individual landholders are simply permitted to keep for themselves all the resource 
units they can extract from the common pool, an inefficiently high rate of depletion and 
attendant waste predictably results (see ibid., S591-93). Unitization agreements that 
maintain common ownership of the resource units after extraction and divide up the 
proceeds according to some predetermined rule alleviate this pressure toward 
overextraction (see ibid., S596). The goal is to create a collective body capable of making 
decisions in the same fully-internalized way as would a single owner, where the fugitive 
nature of the resource makes physical partition of the resource impracticable (see ibid, 
S595-96).17 Alternatively, one party could purchase oil or gas rights from all of the 
overlying landowners, along with any easements necessary to optimally exploit the 
resource (ibid., S593 (citing Demsetz 1967, 357)). Dean Lueck (1989) makes analogous 
points in the context of wildlife populations. As he explains, the fact that an animal herd 
(say, deer) has a territory that far exceeds the optimal land size for the land’s most 
valuable use (say, farming) would not preclude ownership of the herd if the uses were 
compatible and if it were possible for all of the landowners to transact with each other or 
for an outsider to buy up “deer population rights” from each of them (ibid. at 301-03).  
 These moves involve delinking the ownership of the larger-scale resource from 
individual parcel ownership and consolidating the former either in the hands of a single 
owner or in the hands of a collectivity that will act as one. Both approaches eliminate the 
mismatch between ownership of the resource system and the resource units—the former 
by privatizing the resource system as well as the individual resource units, and the latter 
by collectivizing the units as well as the system. The transaction costs associated with 
accomplishing such shifts may be prohibitive, however. First, moving resource systems 
to private ownership or resource units to common ownership may be very difficult, 
                                                 
17 In order to get all owners to agree to unitization, however, a form of partitioning—dividing the resource 
into different physical areas or temporal phases—may be used, despite its potential to pull incentives out of 
alignment. Libecap & Smith 2002, S590-91; S597-606.  
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especially if unanimous consent to the change is required.18 This, as we will see, amounts 
to an anticommons problem. Second, to the extent that delinking uses from either other is 
costly or imperfect, a change in ownership for one use may require abandoning the most 
efficient scale of operation and ownership form for another use. In addition, the shift will 
inevitably create a new interface between privately and commonly owned elements that 
will carry costs of its own. Figure 1 illustrates this point.  
 
Figure 1:   Mixed Ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The heavy vertical line in Figure 1 shows how a given resource system, such as a grazing 
pasture, might divide individually and commonly owned (or controlled) elements. A 
rescaling and associated ownership change can shift that line in one direction or the other, 
but it will not eliminate the line itself or the incentive problems that can occur when 
privately and commonly owned elements interact.  
 For example, parcelization would shift land to private ownership and thus move 
the line to the position of the rightmost dashed line. This removes the grazing 
misalignment flagged above, but the fact that resources like water and air are still 
experienced in common with one’s neighbors may continue to distort incentives.19 
Similarly, moving to collective ownership of cattle remedies the dissonance between 
cattle ownership and land ownership, but creates a new abutment of private and common 
elements at the leftmost dashed line. As long as inputs to cattle care, including labor, 
remain individually owned, the temptation to shirk could replace the overgrazing tragedy 
with a tragedy of underfeeding or poor veterinary care (see Krier 2008, 11). The question 
remains, of course, whether the new interface is less costly than the old one. Under some 
circumstances, shifting elements such as land into private ownership could reduce 
externalities and ease the bargaining burdens associated with accomplishing full 
                                                 
18 In the unitization context, many jurisdictions have addressed these difficulties through compulsory 
unitization laws that permit a specified majority to impose unitization on dissenters—a solution that carries 
its own risks. See Libecap & Smith 2002, S596.  
19 See Demsetz 1967, 356 (discussing this point in the context of constructing a dam that affects a 
neighbor’s water levels), cited and discussed in Krier 2008, 8; Rose 1998a, 95 (noting land’s adjacency “to 
other resources, notably air, water, and wildlife stocks,” that “are considerably more difficult to divide into 
individual properties”); Sinden 2007, 556-61, 583-93 (emphasizing the problems that larger-scale 
phenomena, such as ecosystems, present for private property solutions). 
       Private                                               Common   
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internalization (Demsetz 1967, 356-57; Ellickson 1993, 1330-32), but that result depends 
crucially on the scale of the relevant activities and impacts (e.g., Sinden 2007, 587-94).  
 A shift in ownership, however, represents just one of several ways of ameliorating 
a tragedy-prone payoff structure and the underlying problem of scale. Alternative 
approaches would allow uses to continue at different scales under existing ownership 
forms, but would adopt other measures designed to generate outcomes that look like more 
like those that full internalization would produce.  
 
 D. Addressing the Tragedy 
 
 The problem of incentive misalignment captured in Table 1 can be approached in 
two basic ways: coercively overriding each player’s power to defect, or changing the 
relative payoffs of defection and cooperation.20 The first possibility corresponds most 
closely to Hardin’s idea of “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon,” and typically 
implies the state-wielded threat of force (1968, 1247).21 The second approach involves 
explicitly or implicitly repricing the alternatives so that the choice between them more 
closely reflects the full internalization of costs and benefits.  
 Repricing can take a variety of forms. First, the state (or other collective body) 
can tax defection or subsidize cooperation.22 Setting penalties or rewards at levels that 
capture the previously externalized costs or benefits leave each actor free to engage in 
cost-benefit comparisons incorporating the revised figures. Such an approach can 
accommodate heterogeneity, such as someone who derives an unusually large benefit 
from grazing the marginal steer, in a way that directly coercive approaches cannot. But 
getting the prices right can be tricky. An insufficient penalty may not avert tragedy, and 
excessive rewards for restraint may lead actors to engage in too little of a productive 
activity like ranching.  
 Price adjustments might also be nonpecuniary in nature. For example, a norm-
based sanction and reward system may operate against commoners in a manner closely 
akin to taxes and subsidies by inflicting the pain of social shaming or bestowing the 
pleasure of social inclusion and camaraderie (see McAdams 1997, 352-75). Alternatively, 
norms might be inculcated in a manner that alters the players’ internal calculus, so that 
cooperating brings a glow of satisfaction and defecting produces pangs of remorse and 
                                                 
20 These basic approaches can be carried out through a variety of institutional arrangements. See, e.g., 
Ostrom 1990, 8-21 (critiquing the dichotomy between governmental and private property solutions and 
suggesting that local institutional arrangements offer an alternative); Heller 2008, 24 (“There are three 
distinct approaches [to commons tragedies]: privatization and markets, cooperative engagement, and 
political advocacy and regulation.”).  
21 See Ostrom 1990, 8-9 (discussing potential role of “Leviathan” in resolving commons tragedies).  
22 This basic approach equates to Pigouvian taxation, which endeavors to bring the net private and social 
impacts of a given action into alignment through state-imposed taxes or subsidies. Pigou 1962, 172-203. 
Because taxes are coercively imposed, they too might be classed within Hardin’s “mutual coercion” 
prescription. See, e.g., Krier 1992, 334-35.  
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shame (see ibid., 380-81; cf. Ullmann-Margalit 1977, 36-37). In this way, norms may 
become self-enforcing, diminishing or eliminating the need for monitoring and 
enforcement by the group (McAdams 1997, 380-81).  
 Redrawing property lines represents an indirect way to accomplish repricing.23 
The potential to change the mix of private and common property, and thereby to alter the 
universe of costs and benefits that parties internalize and externalize, has already been 
noted. The redrawing of property boundaries can occur in other ways as well. Incentives 
to overdraw resources from the commons can be blunted by limits on the alienability of 
harvested resources (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1985; Epstein 1985; Lueck 1989; Hsu 2003, 
870; Fennell 2009), by limits on use (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1985; Levmore 2002, S436), 
or even by limits on the owner’s right to exclude others from the extracted resources 
(Heller 1998, 675). All of these alternatives reduce the payoff associated with the 
noncooperative action and hence change ex ante incentives through a brand of 
repricing—although not without some attendant ex post costs.  
  Notwithstanding the array of solutions, the study of the tragedy of the commons 
continues to present a foundational puzzle, one that James Krier (1992) termed “The 
Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two”: Given the incentives for noncooperation, how do 
people ever manage to engage in the impressive acts of cooperation necessary to create 
property in the first place?24 Perhaps overt cooperation was initially unnecessary because 
conventions developed in which possession by one party triggered deference by others 
(see, e.g., Sugden 2004; Krier 2008). But this “possession trumps” convention would not 
work for resource systems that cannot be reduced to possession in their entirety—a 
problem, again, of scale.25 When draws against such resource systems reach problematic 
levels, a response must involve either redrawing property lines or obtaining at least tacit 
consent to a management regime that mandates or incentivizes cooperation. The 
anticommons model sheds light on these difficulties, as well as new ones that may be 
produced by the resulting realignments.  
 
II. Adding the Anticommons  
 
 Frank Michelman (1982) posited an imaginary regime that was the opposite of the 
commons, one in which no person could make use of any resource without obtaining 
                                                 
23 See Smith, “Semicommon Property Rights,” 162-63 (discussing how boundaries may operate not only as 
prices but also as “sanctions” that produce a large discontinuity in payoffs).  
24 As Krier (1992) notes, the puzzle has long been recognized in the literature. See ibid., 338-39 n. 44 
(collecting cites). For more recent discussions, see, e.g., Krier 2008; Rose 1998a.  
25 Some have argued that visible investment in a resource, such as a tilled field, could also induce deference 
even in the absence of possession. See Krier 2008, 29-30 (discussing an argument by Samuel Bowles). 
Even if this is so, the problem identified in the text would remain as to resources of a scale that one cannot 
efficiently exert visible effort upon.  
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permission from every other person (see ibid., 6, 9). This “anticommons”26 turned out to 
possess structural properties of more than mere theoretical interest. Although scholars 
had long realized that multiple vetoes over resource use could produce inefficiency (see, 
e.g., Arrow 1979; Buchanan 1973, 73-74; Demsetz 1967, 354-55; Krier 1992, 335-36), 
Michael Heller (1998, 2008) made this structural dilemma salient and memorable through 
a series of vivid examples that developed, adapted, and applied Michelman’s concept. 
For instance, Heller suggested that the puzzle of busy kiosks near empty storefronts in 
post-socialist Moscow could be explained by the fact that opening a store (but not a 
kiosk) required obtaining permits from multiple actors (Heller 1998, 633–40; 2008, xiv-
xv, 143-56). James Buchanan and Yong Yoon (2000) followed up with a formal model of 
the dilemma, using the example of a parking lot that could only be accessed by patrons 
who obtained a parking pass from each of two independently operating ticket booths 
(ibid., 4-5).   
 The term “anticommons” has since become shorthand for a broad class of 
problems requiring the assembly of permissions or entitlements, from land development 
to patent rights.27 In each case, the worry is the same: that a value-enhancing assembly—
one that could leave every party better off than the status quo—will fail to occur as a 
result of strategic holdout behavior and other transaction costs. Like the tragedy of the 
commons, the tragedy of the anticommons makes inefficiency transparent by creating a 
self-contained system in which participants make themselves worse off. But just as 
commonly owned property does not inevitably lead to a commons tragedy, the dispersal 
of veto rights does not automatically create an anticommons tragedy (Michelman 1985, 
14-15; Heller 1998, 673-75; Heller 2008, 46). 
 
 A. When Is an Anticommons Tragic? 
 
 The problem of the anticommons is fundamentally a problem of assembly—
whether of permissions, land, biotech patents, or something else.28 Putting individually 
controlled fragments together to make a larger whole requires obtaining (or overriding) 
the consent of the fragment-holders, and dividing up the surplus (if any) that the resulting 
assembly will produce. If the individual pieces are protected by a property rule, these two 
operations are linked—consent of each entitlement-holder is required, and the price of the 
fragment may be set at whatever level the entitlement-holder chooses (Calabresi & 
Melamed 1972, 1092, 1106, 1116). Routine transaction costs and strategic behavior can 
make such reconfigurations prohibitively difficult, however, and the assembly may not 
                                                 
26 See Michelman 1985, 6-7 (defining and discussing the “anti-common”); Ellickson 1993, 1322 n.22 
(referencing the “anticommons” and attributing the idea to Michelman 1982).  
27 See, e.g., Heller 1998; Heller & Eisenberg 1998; Heller 2008. Some scholars have questioned the fit 
between the theoretical anticommons problem and various real-world phenomena, particularly with regard 
to patents. See, e.g., Epstein & Kuhlik 2004; Mann 2006, 999-1009.  
28 Heller (2008) suggests that anticommons or “gridlock” problems have become more prevalent because 
“[t]oday, the leading edge of wealth creation requires assembly.” Ibid., xiv.  
11 
occur. This is not necessarily tragic. Not all assemblies should occur, from an efficiency 
perspective. Fragments may be more valuable when kept in separate hands than when 
assembled into a whole; if so, there is no assembly surplus to be had.  
 Thus, diagnosing an anticommons tragedy requires more than pointing out 
fragments that could be put together and noting that they have not been so assembled. 
Those unassembled pieces could bespeak a tragically blocked aggregation, but they might 
instead represent an assembly that was just not worth doing, once everyone’s interests 
and unavoidable transaction costs were taken into account. A focus on the structural 
features conducive to tragedy can offer some, albeit incomplete, guidance. In the absence 
of monopoly power or “thin markets,” a would-be holdout has no leverage and hence no 
incentive to strategically overstate her price. If she tries to do so, the assembler will 
simply obtain a substitute fragment from someone else who is willing to sell more 
cheaply, or create an assembly that leaves out the contested fragment. Thus, 
anticommons tragedies are plausible only in settings where good substitutes are absent. 
 While it is not always easy to assess the availability of substitutes and hence the 
degree of monopoly power that a particular holdout might possess, examining the 
production function for assembly surplus may be helpful. Particularly conducive to 
holdout dynamics are lumpy or “step” goods that do not deliver surplus in smoothly 
increasing increments as additional inputs are added but rather provide a large shot of 
surplus all at once, when the assembly is complete (see, e.g., Taylor & Ward 1982, 353). 
If all of the components are necessary in order for any of the surplus to be enjoyed, the 
last holdout can command a high price—and, perceiving this, each fragment-holder will 
strive to be in that enviable position. In such a case it is possible (although by no means 
certain) that an assembly failure is attributable not to efficient fragmentation but to 
strategic behavior. In contrast, a fragment that will only add a relatively minor portion of 
the surplus that an assembly will produce or that is fungible with other readily available 
components can be much more readily jettisoned from the project, cabining strategic 
holdout behavior.  
  
 B.  The Anticommons and the Commons 
 
 Both the commons and the anticommons tragedies feature self-interested choices 
that are collectively suboptimal. What, then, distinguishes the two dilemmas? Most 
writers on the anticommons, including Heller, strongly associate it with the underuse of 
resources (see, e.g., Heller 2008, 32-37; Buchanan & Yoon 2000, 1; Hsu 2003, 814). 
Although doing so offers an intuitive contrast with the example of resource overuse 
featured in Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, the underuse/overuse dichotomy masks the 
structural nature of both tragedies. The anticommons is an assembly problem, nothing 
more and nothing less. There is nothing in the nature of assembly—whether we are 
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speaking of land, permission, intangibles, or anything else—that necessarily pushes us in 
the direction of intensified use.  
 To be sure, people often want to assemble fragments in order to engage in more 
intensive uses (buying up empty lots to develop a shopping center) but sometimes they 
want to do the opposite (buying up land to construct a large, contiguous nature preserve). 
Similarly, the dispersed veto rights that characterize the anticommons may not only block 
actors from doing something (fishing from a pond, say) but can also block efforts to 
create a world in which actors are not doing that thing. Difficulty assembling consent to 
oil or gas unitization offers a case in point: the anticommons problem in that case, if 
unresolved, will result not in underuse of the resource, but continued overdrawing of it 
(see Heller 2008, 44). Heller’s application of the anticommons model to efforts to 
coordinate conservation efforts further illustrates this point (ibid., 183-84). We can also 
find converse examples involving excessive draws against a common resource like space, 
which represent commons tragedies yielding too little use of a resource (see, e.g., Fennell 
2004, 935).   
 Another unhelpful distinction is that between too many “use privileges” 
(associated with the tragedy of the commons) and too many “exclusion rights” 
(associated with the tragedy of the anticommons) (see Heller 1998, 677). As the 
examples above suggest, sometimes parties keep valuable assemblies from occurring not 
by tacking “keep out” signs on their property, but rather by engaging in uses (like 
polluting or drawing on a common pool) that keep people from being able to enjoy a 
desired resource (like an environment free of pollution or a common pool that remains 
viable over time). For similar reasons, it is not useful to associate the anticommons with 
“too much property” (see Heller 2001, 86, 91-92); the dilemma can as easily stem from 
too little private property.  
 Returning to the patterns of strategic behavior that lie at the heart of the commons 
and anticommons dilemmas, respectively, offers a more promising distinction. Whereas 
the commons tragedy follows the strategic pattern of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the 
anticommons often resembles the strategic game of Chicken.  
 
 C. A Game of Chicken  
 
 Chicken gets its name from a potentially deadly (and, one would hope, largely 
fictional) game in which two drivers speed toward each other, each hoping the other will 
swerve first (see, e.g., Schelling 1966, 81-87; Baird, Gertner & Picker 1994, 43-45). 
There is one way to win the game (induce the other party to swerve first), and three ways 
to lose, in decreasing order of desirability: (1) swerve at the same time as the other party; 
(2) swerve first; and (3) crash into the other party. This same basic strategic interaction 
can be found in less dramatic contexts, such as negotiations between two parties (Baird, 
Gertner & Picker 1994, 43-45). A deal that will produce surplus is worth doing regardless 
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of exactly how that surplus gets divided up, but each party would prefer to receive a 
larger share. Here, “driving straight ahead” means getting more than one’s share of the 
available surplus, “swerving first” means taking less than one’s share in order to facilitate 
the bargain, and “crashing” means that the deal falls apart altogether.  
 In bargaining as in roadway Chicken, one’s best move depends on what the other 
party is going to do. Thus, unlike the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken does not feature 
dominant strategies that combine to produce a single Nash equilibrium; instead, there are 
multiple equilibria (see ibid., 44). A crash is by no means inevitable and indeed should be 
avoidable, but two players who misread each other or miscalculate about the total amount 
of surplus available may stick to positions that, in combination, preclude the successful 
completion of an efficient deal. We need not worry about the crash outcome in 
competitive markets; a party who insisted on a supernormal share of surplus would only 
hurt herself, metaphorically crashing into a wall, while the other party goes on to trade 
with a less problematic partner. But holdout problems similar to those discussed above 
can appear in situations of bilateral monopoly, commonplace in interactions among 
neighbors.  
 Returning to the earlier interaction between Rowena and Columbo illustrates not 
only how the game of Chicken works, but also how the tragedy of the anticommons 
connects to the tragedy of the commons. When we last saw them, our protagonists were 
locked in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, each tempted to add more cattle than would be efficient. 
If they could agree among themselves to refrain from adding the extra ungulates, the 
tragedy of the commons could be averted, and a surplus of eight—the difference between 
the payoffs in the upper left (“both refrain”) cell and the lower right (“both add”) cell—
could be enjoyed between them. Each would be better off with even a little of this surplus 
but each would prefer to get more of it rather than less. Their attempts to assemble 
together the acts of forbearance that will produce the surplus, and their struggle over how 
that surplus will be divided, makes up a Chicken game.29  
 
Table 2:  Chicken Game 
Payoffs for (Rowena, Columbo) 
 Columbo Swerves Columbo Drives 
Ahead 
Rowena Swerves  (4, 4) (1, 7) 
Rowena Drives 
Ahead  
(7, 1) (0, 0) 
                                                 
29 This insight (without the Chicken label) was captured in Demsetz 1967, 354–55 (explaining that an effort 
to solve a commons problem by mutual agreement may be blocked by a “hold-out” who, in the meantime, 
retains “the right to work the land as fast as he pleases”); see Krier 1992, 335-36 (discussing Demsetz’s 
work and presenting an example involving excessive tree-chopping, in which “[e]ach chopper is effectively 
a monopolist whose agreement is essential to saving any trees”). 
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 The outcome in the lower-right corner is the “no deal” or “crash” outcome in 
which all of the available surplus is lost, dispreferred by both parties. However, each 
party will try to play the strategy of “drive ahead” if she thinks the other party can be 
bullied into swerving. The concern here is not that one party or the other will get an 
“unfair” share of the surplus; that may be a problem for independent normative reasons, 
but it is a question of distribution rather than efficiency (see, e.g., Cohen 1991, 352-53). 
Rather, the worry is that each will push too far, miscalculate, and contribute to a crash. 
The crash in question involves nothing other than a failure of contracting—long 
recognized as the true root of common resource dilemmas (Cheung 1970).  
 Although these two-player games are helpful for examining strategic interactions, 
the prototypical anticommons problem, like the prototypical commons tragedy, is a 
multi-player game. This is not a coincidence. While two-party bargains can sometimes 
lead to impasse, the risk of the “crash” outcome is greatly magnified when many different 
parties hold independent vetoes on an assembly of entitlements. Misreadings and 
miscalculations become more likely in the many-player case, and mundane transaction 
costs associated with identifying and communicating with the other parties rise as well. 
Seen in this light, a potential anticommons problem lies between every garden-variety 
commons problem and its solution. Put differently, the anticommons problem and its 
underlying Chicken Game structure sheds light on an important aspect of the contracting 
problems that can perpetuate commons tragedies.  
 
 D. Linked Tragedies and Solutions 
 
 The example above shows one connection between the anticommons and the 
commons, but the relationship between these models requires further exploration. Recall 
again the slate of solutions to the tragedy of the commons: mandating cooperation, or 
repricing the choice between cooperation and defection. One mechanism for repricing 
involves redrawing property lines so that actors better internalize the costs and benefits of 
their choices. Implementing this alternative may involve granting various actors 
ownership or control of individual fragments or parcels—a rightward shift of the vertical 
line in Figure 1. The anticommons literature has stressed the potential difficulty in 
reassembling the resulting fragments into a unified whole.30 This line of reasoning 
emphasizes the link between commons and anticommons tragedies that has received the 
greatest amount of scholarly attention: A “propertized” solution to the tragedy of the 
commons may create a tragedy of the anticommons (see, e.g., Heller 2008, 18).  
 This is an important point, but the analysis underlying it is incomplete in at least 
two respects. First, the inefficiency produced, if any, is not unique to the propertized 
solution, but could stem from any response to a tragedy of the commons that is premised 
                                                 
30 This argument rests on the “Humpty Dumpty” claim that assembling fragments is more difficult than 
breaking apart unified entitlements. See, e.g., Heller 1999, 1169; Parisi 2002; Micili & Sirmans 2000. 
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on errors or faulty assumptions about the most efficient use of the resource over time. A 
commons from which all commoners have been coercively banished by the government 
is just as “tragic” (assuming some use of the commons would be optimal) as one that no 
commoner can assemble sufficient permission to enter. What propertization adds to the 
story, at least potentially, is a heightened level of stickiness.31 A system of fines can 
simply be altered to reflect new prices, or a ban on particular behaviors (like fishing 
above a certain quota) can be lifted or relaxed. Such changes are routinely accomplished 
through the political system and therefore do not require unanimous consent from all 
those adversely affected. But easy access to political overrides is not an unmixed 
blessing; good as well as bad interventions into commons tragedies can be undone. In 
some cases, the stickiness in arrangements that stems from propertization can actually 
enhance efficiency over time (see Bell & Parchomovsky 2003). 
 A second, more fundamental inadequacy in the usual connection drawn between 
the commons and the anticommons can be seen by returning to Figure 1’s vertical line 
dividing the realms of individually and commonly owned property. The anticommons is 
usually thought to stymie only leftward moves of that dividing line—that is, moves that 
would increase the domain of the commons relative to the domain of individual 
ownership. But why should that be so? Rightward moves that take elements out of the 
commons and place them under individual ownership can also be vetoed by interested 
stakeholders.32 Indeed, solving the tragedy of the commons in any manner (whether 
through redrawing property lines or otherwise) requires actors to give up something—
their current untrammeled access (whether de jure or de facto) to the resource in question 
(Krier 1992, 335-36). To the extent that such access represents something like a property 
interest, efforts to aggregate consent to a plan of forbearance may itself present an 
anticommons dynamic. Thus, it is not only propertized interventions into a commons 
tragedy that can trigger an anticommons; an anticommons dynamic typically interposes 
itself between a commons tragedy and its solution. Thus, assembling forbearance in the 
commons can produce an anticommons dilemma (see Heller 2008, 183-84; Rose 1998a, 
94). This is precisely the point that was illustrated above when the original Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (commons dilemma) between Rowena and Columbo in Table 1 morphed into 
Table 2’s game of Chicken (anticommons dilemma) once they began to negotiate a 
solution.  
 The anticommons theorist might respond that it is easier, politically and legally, to 
forcibly aggregate forbearance than it is to aggregate other kinds of entitlement fragments 
(Heller 1999, 1195-96). That is an empirical question, but at least one take on the issue 
deserves attention: Granting property rights may be instrumental to aggregating 
                                                 
31 It is possible to make property interests more easily reversible. For example, entitlements might be 
protected only with liability rules—in effect, extending a call option to nonowners. See, e.g., Morris 1993, 
852.  
32 See Dahlman 1980, 187 (discussing strategic opposition to enclosure by those hoping to capture more of 
the resulting surplus). 
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forbearance. Consider here the prevalence of “grandfathering” provisions within 
legislation designed to curtail draws against common pool resources (see, e.g., Nash & 
Revesz 2007, 1730; Levmore 1999, 1665-66). If it is impossible to move from one 
inefficiently fragmented entitlement pattern without introducing a newly fragmented 
ownership pattern, we should not lament the fact that the new arrangement 
“propertizes”—in fact, it may be replacing a less efficient form of de facto propertization. 
On this account, property—and the veto power it confers—does not only feature in 
anticommons tragedies, but may also be essential to overcoming them.  
  
III. Scale and the Semicommons  
 
 Resource systems, as we experience them on the ground, are never solely 
composed of individually owned or commonly owned elements. Instead, we constantly 
encounter interacting mixtures of private and common property.33 In developing the 
notion of the “semicommons,” Henry Smith (2000) focused attention on a subset of these 
interacting elements—those in which “both common and private uses are important and 
impact significantly on each other” (ibid., 131-32) In the remaining space, I will examine 
how this subset, as well as the larger category of mixed property regimes, relates to the 
commons, the anticommons, and the unifying problem of scale.  
 
 A. Seeing the Semicommons  
 
 As Smith explains, medieval farming and grazing arrangements constituted a 
semicommons: pieces of farmland were individually owned but the land as a whole was 
shared for grazing purposes (ibid, 132). In the open field arrangement, grazing alternated 
with farming in a seasonal cycle (ibid.), but this sequential feature is not essential to the 
notion of a semicommons. What is important is that the ownership arrangements 
reflected the different scales at which two activities—farming and grazing—were best 
undertaken (see ibid.). Rather than hold farmland in contiguous blocks or parcels, the 
commoners who shared the grazing land each held a number of physically dispersed 
strips (see Ellickson 1993, 1388-90 & fig. 3). While a variety of reasons for this 
arrangement have appeared in the literature, including the diversification of risk, Smith 
(2000, 146-54) has emphasized its role in controlling strategic behavior. Interspersing 
farmland holdings dampens the incentives that commoners might otherwise have to use 
their private holdings or their access to the common grazing land strategically to burden 
or benefit particular parcels: the physical layout binds together the fates of many different 
owners (ibid.).  
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Michelman 1985, 13 (“[A]ny practicable, real-world so-called private property regime must 
contain large doses of both common and anti-common.”). 
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 The farming and grazing semicommons thus contained a built-in solution to the 
problems presented by mixtures of private and common property. But the idea of the 
semicommons sweeps more broadly to reach interacting mixtures of common and private 
property, whether managed in this manner or not.34 Nonetheless, Smith’s semicommons 
property represents a relatively narrow category of mixed property. In what Smith (2000, 
161) has termed “true semicommons property,” the commonly and privately owned 
elements “cover the same physical resource,” such as land. The incentive structure also 
differs from that of the prototypical commons in which each rancher must bear 1/n of the 
costs of an added animal (ibid., 139; Bertacchini, Mot & Depoorter 2008, 9). In a 
semicommons, privately owned elements (such as sheep) may be used to impose costs 
not indiscriminately on the commons as a whole but selectively on other people’s 
privately owned elements (such as farming lands); similarly, commoners might use their 
access to the commons to benefit their own private property at the expense of other 
parties’ property (for example, by attempting to direct trampling sheep elsewhere) (see 
Smith 2000, 161; Bertacchini, Mot & Depoorter 2008, 4-9).  
 Thus cabined, a semicommons is indeed distinguishable from the stylized 
commons in which defecting means proportionately harming every member of the group, 
oneself included. But the prototypical commons with its homogeneous players and 
perfectly symmetrical payoffs operates more as a metaphor or thought experiment than as 
an approximation of reality. Because producers of externalities rarely bear a perfectly 
proportionate share of the costs they impose, real-world situations classified as commons 
dilemmas often hew much closer to the semicommons model. More broadly, the 
challenges brought to light by the semicommons—operations at multiple scales and the 
resulting interaction of different ownership regimes—encompass the tragedies of both the 
commons and the anticommons, whether considered in prototypical or contextualized 
form.  
 On this account, the semicommons is less a distinctive property type than a 
manner of seeing—a lens or frame through which to view existing or proposed 
arrangements that involve activities at different scales, whether simultaneously or over 
time. I have already suggested that tragedies of the commons are driven by the incentive 
misalignments produced by differently scaled activities under different ownership 
regimes. These mixed regimes are usefully illuminated by the semicommons analysis. 
We can now examine how the anticommons fits in.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 In later work, Smith (2005; 2008) has suggested that other, differently managed resources—
telecommunications and water—share the semicommons structure. Other authors have employed the 
semicommons in other contexts. See, e.g., Heverly 2003, 1164-83 (information); Loren 2007, 274-75 
(creative works); Fennell 2008, 1102 (neighborhoods and metropolitan areas). 
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 B.  The Anticommons and the Semicommons 
 
 What pulls incentives out of alignment in a tragedy of the commons is not 
common ownership alone, but rather the interface between private and common 
ownership. That interface can be altered either by parcelizing more of what is commonly 
owned or bringing under common ownership more of what is privately owned. Neither 
move eliminates the potential for strategic interaction between privately and commonly 
owned elements. As long as spillovers exist, parcelization is incomplete. Similarly, any 
system that leaves individuals with some control over their own bodies and labor leaves 
some vestige of private ownership (or its analogue) in the picture. Nonetheless, changing 
the mix of common and private property may produce a new mixed regime that aligns 
better with the scale of events affecting the actors’ returns (see Ellickson 1993, 1325-35).  
 Accomplishing the reconfiguration of property rights, however, requires either 
obtaining or overriding the consent of the parties affected, and somehow distributing the 
resulting surplus. This is where the anticommons comes in. If the parties are given a veto 
over the reconfiguration, an anticommons dynamic may keep it from happening. As 
discussed above, this may not be a bad thing; it depends on whether the present 
configuration is more or less efficient than the proposed revision, which in turn depends 
(at least in part) on questions of efficient scale. Similarly, once a reconfiguration of 
ownership occurs, an anticommons dynamic may lock it in place. Again, this could be 
benign (if the reconfiguration is, and remains, efficient) or tragic (if the reconfiguration 
was undertaken in error or becomes inefficient over time).  
 If the desired shift is in the direction of more private ownership, consent of each 
commoner to the change might be won by granting that commoner private property in 
exchange for the commoner releasing other claims on the commons. For example, each 
person fishing from a common pool could agree to desist from unlimited fishing in 
exchange for an entitlement to extract a particular number of fish. Even in the absence of 
a catch limit, extraction of fish from a common pool involves the de facto exchange of 
one’s share in the fish as part of the commons for individual ownership of the fish itself 
(Nash 2008, 29 n. 82). If the shift is in the direction of more common property, people 
might be induced to give up private holdings in exchange for a cash buyout or a share in 
the new commons. In both cases, aggregating consent may be difficult, as each 
participant tries to obtain a larger share of the resulting surplus.  
 Of course, a political system could simply override the lack of consent to the 
reconfiguration under either scenario, dividing the surplus as it chooses, subject to 
constitutional constraints such as the requirement of just compensation. The 
anticommons literature has suggested an asymmetry exists in this political capacity, 
however—that moves from private property to common property are less likely to be 
coercively accomplished than moves from common property to private property (e.g., 
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Heller 1999, 1195-96).35 To the extent this is true, it would suggest a ratchet effect in 
which property becomes increasingly parcelized over time (ibid., 1165-66). It is worth 
asking, however, whether what makes the move from common property to private 
property so politically palatable—that is, what makes people believe that they have been 
fairly compensated for relinquishing their claims on the commons—is the very fact that 
the currency in which they are compensated (property) tends to be relatively resistant to 
later majoritarian decisionmaking. Before property-based solutions to commons tragedies 
are rejected, then, it is necessary to consider whether there is any better way of solving 
the commons tragedy, given that arriving at a solution itself presents an anticommons 
problem of sorts. The answer may be yes, if property lines can be drawn (or redrawn) in a 
way that simultaneously accommodates multiple scales, builds in future reversibility, or 
both.  
 A focus on reversibility suggests an interesting direction in which the logic of the 
semicommons might be extended. Thus far, the semicommons literature has focused on 
the simultaneous or “temporally interleaved” use of resources (Smith 2002, S481). Such a 
mixed ownership regime might accommodate multiple activities that can be most 
efficiently pursued concurrently at different scales. But there is an analogous problem of 
accommodating differently scaled uses of resources over time—what we might 
characterize as a temporal semicommons.36 For example, individual pieces of land might 
be most efficiently held as individual homesteads at Time 1, but might be more valuable 
when combined to form some larger development or preserve at Time 2. Just as the 
judicious drawing of property boundaries can allow activities to be pursued 
simultaneously at different scales under different ownership rubrics—that is, without 
private ownership wrecking things for the commons, or vice versa—so too might 
property be crafted in a manner that allows a resource to be used in different 
configurations at different times.  
 Thus, the semicommons idea, writ large, speaks to the fact that it is efficient to 
have property configured in different ways under different circumstances, whether those 
circumstances occur at the same time or at different times. Allowing those different 
property arrangements to coexist (whether in space or over time) requires defeating or 
precluding strategic behavior. The mechanisms employed in the traditional semicommons 
bear a striking resemblance to some of the strategies that have been developed to deal 
with reconfiguration challenges over time.37 The next section explores these approaches. 
                                                 
35 For a discussion of the potential for “reemerging commons” following privatization that focuses on the 
relevance of interest groups as well as transaction costs, see generally Levmore 2002.  
36 The text refers to multiple efficient scales that abut each other in time rather than space. A different facet 
of the relationship between time and the semicommons involves the use of rotation systems and similar 
mechanisms to avoid strategic behavior, providing a temporal analogue to the scattered farming strips. See 
Smith 2000, 165-66. 
37 Doctrines that limit the degree of fragmentation that can occur in the first place can also serve to address 
reconfiguration challenges over time (see Heller 1999, 1176-82; see also Ellickson 1993, 1374; Michelman 
1982, 15-16).  
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 C. Strategy-Proof Solutions 
 
 The existence of historic semicommons emphasizes that it may be efficient, at 
least for a time, to maintain operations on multiple scales and make other arrangements to 
align incentives. As Smith (2000, 132) explains, “[a] semicommons need not be tragic 
where the benefits from operating on multiple scales outweigh the costs of strategic 
behavior and its prevention.” Thus, awareness of the semicommons prompts us to 
consider various forms of strategy-proofing as alternatives to altering the mix of privately 
owned and commonly owned elements within a resource system, where different efficient 
scales of operation exist for different uses.  
 The scattered pattern of farmland ownership within common grazing fields shows 
how mechanism design can harness self-interest and defeat strategic behavior. As Smith 
explains, the system works in part by making boundaries more obscure and rendering it 
more difficult to tell whether a particular act will be to one’s benefit or detriment (Smith 
2002, 480-81). This idea of veiling decisionmakers from crucial information about the 
personal implications of their decisions also underlies a broad range of strategies for 
eliciting unbiased information and advancing distributive goals, from the “veil of 
ignorance” thought experiment in Rawlsian analysis, to the “one divides, the other 
chooses” strategy for dividing up cakes (and other things) (see Smith 2000, 165; see also 
Rawls 1971, 85, 136-42; Brams & Taylor 1996). While the physical interspersal that 
blurs boundaries in medieval grazing fields is not feasible in many settings, the idea of 
generating useful uncertainty can be readily transplanted.  
 For example, the challenge of accomplishing efficient reconfigurations over time 
can be addressed using liability rules that rely on self-assessed valuations (e.g., Tideman 
1969, 59-61; Fennell 2005). Without reliable valuations, it is impossible to know whether 
a given reconfiguration would be efficient. But getting truthful valuations is obviously 
difficult when a party knows in advance whether a higher or a lower number will be to 
her benefit. Consciously constructing situations in which that information is veiled or 
blurred—as where a stated valuation is made not only a basis for receiving compensation 
but also a basis for paying a tax—can alleviate, even if it cannot eliminate, the problem of 
strategic valuations (see, e.g., Levmore 1982). While this type of approach may seem to 
take us far afield from the semicommons, the genius of the semicommons solution 
similarly resides in its capacity to render the implications of stratagems unclear, and 
hence deter them.  
  
Conclusion 
 
 Our tour of the commons, anticommons, and semicommons has revealed a 
number of connections among these models, but the overarching theme of scale deserves 
special emphasis. Property forms attempt to match the scale of the relevant activity, but 
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resources are often used in multiple ways, spillovers are ubiquitous, and privately and 
commonly owned elements are always interacting. The commons literature highlights 
one facet of this interaction: the mismatch between private and collective returns to a 
given act.  
 The anticommons shows us how difficult it can be to solve a commons problem 
through a rearrangement of property rights, as well as how difficult it can be to undo any 
solution that we manage to cobble together. While these are interesting points in their 
own right, we must ask why all this assembly—whether of consent to a consolidation of 
property interests, or of forbearance with respect to a common pool resource—is 
necessary in the first place. The answer involves changes over time in the efficient scale 
of activities.  The difficulties in moving from one property arrangement to another, 
highlighted by the anticommons analysis, also bears on the central puzzle of property’s 
formation. While certain conventions may have initially helped to develop the line 
between what is commonly owned and what is privately owned, changes over time in the 
costs and benefits of particular property arrangements often cause the optimal position of 
that line to shift (see Demsetz 1967). Regardless of whether the contemplated move will 
involve more individually owned property or more commonly owned property, getting 
those who hold a stake in the resource to agree to the shift can implicate the 
anticommons’ holdout dynamic. 
 Our understanding of both the commons and anticommons can be enriched by the 
semicommons analysis, which highlights both the problems associated with using 
resources on multiple scales, as well as the potential efficiency of this arrangement when 
undertaken in conjunction with strategy-proofing measures. Incentive-compatible 
mechanisms not unlike those used in the spatial semicommons can help to build 
reversibility into property arrangements so that activities can be pursued at different 
scales not only concurrently but also consecutively.  
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